

A Theoretical Framework to study Civil Society Functions in Macedonia

ABSTRACT

This paper analysis civil society as a fundamental element in transition processes, seeking to understand the democratic difficulties that many post-transition societies deal with, and how civil society can contribute to the consolidation of democracy. The main research question guiding this study is: What has been the role of civil society in Macedonia's democratization process? Drawing on theories of democratization and theories of civil society, a conceptual framework is outlined in an attempt to contribute to our understanding of how and under which conditions civil society contributes to democracy in multiethnic societies, like the Macedonian one. This, however, also implies an understanding of the main problems with which many post-transition societies are confronted with.

INTRODUCTION

This paper analysis civil society as a fundamental element in transition processes, seeking to understand the democratic difficulties that many post-transition societies deal with, and how civil society can contribute to the consolidation of democracy. The main research question guiding this study is: What has been the role of civil society in Macedonia's democratization process? Drawing on theories of democratization and theories of civil society, a conceptual framework is outlined in an attempt to contribute to our understanding of how and under which conditions civil society can contribute to democracy in multiethnic societies, like the Macedonian one. This, however, also implies an understanding of the main problems with which many post-transition societies are confronted with.

The case examined in this paper is the process of consolidation of democracy in Macedonia.¹ After an ethnic conflict in 2001, the country seems to be heading towards a more stable democracy, but this process is still constrained by ethnic problems among the population, prevalent corruption and weak rule of law. Also the low level of economic development did not ease the fragile situation. Thus, the more empirical purpose of this paper is to gain better understanding of the democratic process in Macedonia and if or how civil society has contributed to this process.

Before taking a closer look at civil society in Macedonia, this paper reviews civil society role in democratisation process, using the theoretical model of Wolfgang Merkel to explain civil society basic functions in this process. In this analysis will try to assess the role of civil society in Macedonia regarding three still problematic issues: human rights (ethnic situation), corruption and rule of law.

CONCEPTUALIZATION: DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Considering that Macedonia is in a process of consolidation of democracy, it is important to distinguish between democratic transition and democratic consolidation. The first one focuses on the behaviour of political elites and their constitutional tasks in the period of political transformation: negotiating the political settlement, setting the rules of procedure, dismantling authoritarian agencies, and abolishing laws incompatible with democracy. Democratic consolidation is generally held to be a lengthier process, whether the definition of democracy involved is a narrow one of electoral democracy or a wider definition of liberal democracy. Geoffrey Pridham and Attila Agh suggest that democratic consolidation may take closer to a generation than to a decade to accomplish.² Consolidation involves broad social and cultural factors, issues of democratic values, attitudes and behaviour. This is a particularly complicated process in the Balkans where transformation is required at different levels and across different sectors.

Of course, much depends on the definitions of democracy. Larry Diamond distinguishes between electoral democracy – democracies in which there are regular, fair and free elections – and liberal democracy, which has not only regular, fair and free elections but a raft of provisions for the protection of individual rights and the sustenance of the rule of law.³

Linz and Stepan consider a democracy only when it protects the rights of individuals. They are critical of what they term the “electoral fallacy”, that is the idea that free elections are a sufficient condition of democracy.⁴ If a freely elected government violates the rights of individuals, and fails to rule within the bounds of law, the regime can not be considered democratic. These authors define a consolidated democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules and ways of behaving and suggest five conditions for a consolidated democracy: a free and lively civil society, an autonomous political society, the rule of law, an usable state bureaucracy and an economic society providing the framework for free markets.⁵ This is particularly relevant in the context of post-communism Europe where there has been a great deal of post-communism diversity. While some countries have been relatively successful in their transitions to democracy (in Central and Eastern Europe), other countries have been plagued with semi-authoritarian or outright authoritarian governments since the collapse of communism (like the Balkans ones).

The consolidation of democracy involves bottom up (the strengthening and diversification of civil society) and top down (the rationalization and the democratization of the main state institutions) processes. These two halves of the consolidation process are mutually reinforcing.⁶ However, in Macedonia uneven access to intermediary institutions and uneven distribution of power continue to constrict civil society. As is the case with governments themselves, elites often hold sway over nongovernmental institutions as well. Weak procedural democracies can be made strong in the substantive sense with active networks of civic associations of all kinds. While procedural democracies give citizens periodic choices through elections and the ballot box, civil society – with its unions, churches, community associations,

cultural organizations and other nongovernmental associations – gives citizens choices every day. How those choices can further the public good is central to education for civic competence. And this is central to building a strong democracy.

A democratic political system not only allows, but also encourages its citizens to take active part in public life. It is one of the key features of democracy that people act together in an organised manner in order to formulate and express their interests, values and identities. Civil society, as understood in this study, is the sphere where such organised, 'bottom-up' activity takes place. It is by definition independent from the state and the business sector, as indicated by the concept of 'third sector', which is often used interchangeably with 'civil society'. While the former refers more narrowly to voluntary non-profit organisations, the latter also incorporates interest groups, social partners, movements, networks and ad hoc groupings.

As Linz and Stepan argues, civil society is "an arena in which self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests".⁷ In this definition the emphasis is placed on self-organizing groups which implies voluntary associations of individuals, and it excludes the family (or the private sphere). In regards to excluding the private sphere from the definition of civil society, Warren affirms that "the reason for excluding these conceptions from civil society is that there is nothing "civil" about such attachments – they are "private", and operate below the threshold of common collective action".⁸ This is particularly important in the context of post-communism Europe where private networks have been shown to have persisted past the collapse of communism.

The importance of civil society for democracy and democratisation has become widely acknowledged as part of the post-cold war democratic paradigm. The very concept of civil society re-emerged in political and academic discourse along with the democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Since then it has made its way into the democracy promotion policies of all major Western states and organisations.

In this paper we argue that civil society is an important dimension of the democratic consolidation process in Macedonia. Civil society is regarded as an important factor in the democratization process for two reasons. First, it is generally assumed that civil society contributes to democratic development by generating democratic values or fostering civic education among the citizens, thereby supporting the regime. Second, it is assumed that civil society acts as a countervailing power and limits state power and thereby contributes to democratic development.⁹

One of the essentially important and complex conditions of successful democratic consolidation and sustainable democracy is an "active and dynamic" civil society.¹⁰ Also, Diamond points to civil society as promoting not only a transition to democracy, but also its "deepening" and consolidation once democracy is established.¹¹ While in Diamond's view, civil society does not play the central role initially, "the more active, pluralistic, resourceful, institutionalized, and internally democratic civil society is...the more likely democracy will be to emerge and endure".¹²

The existence of a relatively developed civil society undoubtedly has positive effects and contributes to the possibility of consolidated and lasting democracy. As Philippe Schmitter put it, civil society contributes to democratic consolidation, but does not cause or create it.¹³ Schmitter considers civil society as “a set or system of self-organized intermediary groups that: 1) are relatively independent of both public authorities and private units of production and reproduction, that is, of firms and families; 2) are capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions in defence or promotion of their interests or passions; 3) do not seek to replace either state agents or private (re) producers or to accept responsibility for governing the polity as a whole; and 4) agree to act within pre-established rules of a ‘civil’ nature, that is, conveying mutual respect”.¹⁴

The process of democratization includes the creation of civic organisations that are able to perform these functions, and the development of relations between the state and civil society so as to allow the latter to contribute to the functioning of democracy. In very general terms, civil society is needed in democratisation for two purposes: first, to move the process forward and second, to prevent it from sliding backwards.¹⁵

Civil society *per se* is not a sufficient requisite of democracy, but it could be an important actor in the process of strengthening democracy. Naturally there are other actors that could craft democracy, and focusing on civil society does not give a complete picture of the democratization problems. However, focusing on civil society provides one rewarding approach to our understanding of democratic development in post transition societies like the Macedonia one.

Civil society is seen to perform the two basic functions of service delivery and advocacy, but in Macedonia, especially in the wake of the 1999 and 2001 crises, it has assumed a third task as well, the reconstruction of social capital. In Macedonia, the terms non governmental organizations (NGO) and civil society organizations (CSO) also take on a different meaning from elsewhere. Rather than being a subset of the NGO universe, civil society and CSO becomes the larger universe, which is divided into NGOs (formal, officially registered bodies) and non-formal organizations (NFOs, which may be longer short-lived and more or less well organized).

The existence of civil society obviously requires, on the one hand, a democratic political system that guarantees the civic freedoms of association, opinion and speech. On the other hand, the functioning of democracy requires civic activity, and the quality and strength of democracy are defined, among other things, by the level of civil society (if it is still in formation or already an important factor of the state). Above all, it is politically-oriented civic activity – politically in a broad sense, aimed at having an impact on public life and the functioning of (a certain aspect of) society – that helps to create a sustainable democracy. Politically-oriented civil society stands close to two other sectors that are also inevitable for democracy: the media and political parties (the media, however, is often commercial as opposed to the non-profit nature of civil society; and political parties, unlike civil society organisations, strive for power in state institutions). Civil society also includes many groups and organisations that do not have a

direct relevance for democracy, for instance sports clubs and cultural associations and many other kinds of leisure activities. Even the non-political forms of civic activity may, however, contribute to generating trust and solidarity among citizens, which are essential for a democratic community.

A civil society is a network of nongovernmental institutions capable of developing their own positions on issues of national or local importance. Together with agencies, courts, and the media, civil society can expose corrupt officials and pressure elected officials to keep campaign promises. At the same time, activity in civil society can ease the demands on the state, as organizations can often develop their own solution to problems and create horizontal ties among citizens that decrease the importance of vertical relationships with political culture. People who come together to work on a particular problem are more likely to overcome ethnic or class differences. By giving attention to issues that bring people together across ethnic or class lines, organizations can moderate political polarization in a country and create a culture of tolerance. This is particularly important in Balkan societies, where the history of authoritarianism, the absence of the rule of law, the violation of human rights and the largely illiberal cultural traditions of both the Orthodox Church and of Islam, make up a difficult inheritance.

THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN MACEDONIA

Civil Society in Macedonia has played a significant role in the history of the country. The country's independence in 1990 and the ensuing transition were not the beginning of civil society, rather an important trigger for its further development and the significant increase of its role.¹⁶

A great wave of civic organizations began with the transition process: the environmental organizations occurred in the end of the 80s, the social-humanitarian organizations at the beginning of the 90s (as a response to the economic and refugees crisis from former Yugoslavia) and the human rights organizations in the mid-90's. In the last 19 years, the number and scope of non-governmental organizations operating in Macedonia have risen dramatically. Many of them address significant societal, political, and economic issues, representing the interests of women, physically disable people, and sexual and ethnic minorities.¹⁷

The defining feature of Macedonian civil society has been war. Strongly committed to peace, the civil sector in Macedonia is influenced by a long history of wars in the country (such as the Balkan Wars 1912/1913 and the I and II World Wars) and the fact that war was the largest threat for Macedonia in the 1990's with raging conflicts in neighbouring Croatia (1992-1995), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1999). This commitment is even more important in a society ethnically divided as it is the Macedonian one.¹⁸¹ Civil society faced one of the biggest humanitarian crises in 1999 with the Kosovo war. This crisis attracted a

¹ In the last census there were 64% of Macedonians, 25% of Albanians, 3% of Turks, and 1.9% of Roma (EC, 2010a: 2).

considerable number of large international humanitarian agencies and significant resources, which influenced the social-humanitarian character of the agenda of civil society in the following years.

The first institutional development activates for civil society as a whole were undertaken in 1995, with the activities for the adoption of a Law on Citizen Associations and Foundations (adopted in 1998 and amended in 2007, after several revisions recommended by Macedonian civil society). This law introduced its own definition of civil society: association based on values and interests, which are positive, non-partisan, not-for-profit and not-for-business activities.¹⁹ The legal definition has three issues with a significant influence in the understanding of the concept of civil society in Macedonia. The first resulted from the positive values, this means that organizations that call for racial, religious and national hatred and intolerance and violence are forbidden. The second issue is that the civic sector is different from political parties. The third one is that this law does not define trade unions, chambers of commerce, churches or religious communities, for which there are separate laws.

On April 12, 2010, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia enacted a new Law on Associations and Foundations, known as the NGO Law, which had a strong influence from civil society suggestions. Representing a significant development for Macedonia, this law provides a comprehensive and progressive framework regulation for NGOs; supports their sustainability by allowing NGOs to engage in economic activities; helps increase the social impact of the civil sector by introducing “public benefit status”; and brings the Macedonian legal system into closer harmony with European standards.²⁰

The institutional development became particularly important after 2001 armed conflict in Macedonia. A large scale confrontation with the government took place, with civil society developing an important role insisting on a peaceful and non-violent resolution of the conflict. 2001 was also the beginning of the Forum of Civil Society in Macedonia – NGO Fair, which was the catalyst for the activities based on common interests of the civic sector in Macedonia. Considered unique by its contents and form, the NGO Fair has become one of the major events of the civil society in Macedonia. It allows the exchange of experiences, the exposure to the work of CSO, increase communication, and promotes the public awareness of civil society.

While the main hindrance to independent civil society is obviously the lack of democracy, there are also other considerable obstacles that need to be addressed in the course of democratization, and in the consolidation phase, especially in a region like the Western Balkans, including Macedonia.

One of them is socio-economic conditions: many social studies show a correlation between the level of welfare and education on the one hand and civic activity on the other. This is valid for both a comparison between countries and differences within societies: poorer countries display lower levels of civic activity, and weaker social groups tend to be more passive everywhere. Therefore, poverty reduction has to be an important part of supporting civic activity.

In Macedonia, the economic situation is not favourable to civic activity. Unemployment remained very high (34%)²¹ and poverty affects all the population, especially the young (55%)

and the minorities, like the Roma, which continued to have the lowest incomes (about 63% live below the poverty line).²²

Another group of factors that accounts for the weakness of civil society is history, tradition and culture – if people are simply not accustomed to defending their interests and taking active part in public life, they do not easily change their habits even if the political system becomes more favourable to civic activity. Previous regime type is a particularly strong factor in explaining the level of civil society.

In Macedonia, the Yugoslav socialist period that lasted until Macedonia's breakaway into independence in 1991 provided an insulated societal system that maintained basic social services and assured high employment. The regime even allowed a certain low level of civil society participation in the form of local sports clubs and carefully circumscribed Neighbourhood Units, while keeping in place an authoritarian one-party system, a widespread repression of civil rights and political liberties, and a structure of front organizations that provided only a faint semblance of democratic civil society.²³

Whether at national or local level, government was seen during the socialist era as a huge benefit-supplying apparatus. Jobs, services, pensions, welfare were what it provided, and, not surprisingly in this ethos of public-sector patronage, the sense of entitlement became large. In Yugoslav days this amounted to a one-party spoils system, and now it has turned into a multi-party spoils system, such that the winning party tries to allot jobs and services to its followers to the extent that it can. The entitlement instinct still runs strong, now filtered through a partisan party-based machine. Equally important, everything that government does tends to be interpreted in terms of party patronage and favouritism — impersonal, rational behaviour in conducting government business is not how citizens perceive the public sector to function.

Also, the major ethnic communities co-existed in that they lived next to each other, largely in separate neighbourhoods and village settlements, but they were never really integrated. After the ethnic crisis of 2001, the Ohrid Framework Agreement intended to provide a path out of the crisis, and has served as the guideline for restoring ethnic co-existence, but the fissures between the principal communities have long been so deep that it will take a long time for bridging social capital to have any real lasting impact. Although the OFA remains somewhat unpopular among ethnic Macedonians, it has brought peace and stability. Polls conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) show that while 82% of respondents said the country was unstable in 2001, by December 2009, 79% said Macedonia's stability had remained steady or increased.²⁴

Besides the socio-economic conditions and the history, tradition and culture, we have also to take into consideration the political context in which civil society in Macedonia operates and develops its activities. The state can facilitate as well as obstruct civil society's potential for crafting democracy. Despite the progress in the field of basic rights and freedoms, Macedonia civil society's political context is unfavourable. The most limiting factors are the (lack of) rule of law, corruption, and an (in)efficient state.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN MACEDONIA

In order to increase our understanding of the manifold democracy-building functions that civil society could have in a post-transition society like the Macedonian, a framework for analysis will be outlined here. There have been some attempts to categorize civil society's democracy-building functions. In *Developing Democracy toward Consolidation*, for example, Diamond claims that civil society has thirteen different roles to play in promoting democratic development.²⁵ While each and every one of the thirteen roles Diamond outlines seems reasonable, one could certainly question the analytical gains of a model that includes thirteen roles for civil society.

With the same concern, in his analysis of civil society and democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, Wolfgang Merkel, offered a theoretical model with five different paradigms explaining the basic functions of civil society in the processes of democratic changes. In this paper we use this model to assess if and how civil society in Macedonia contributes to the country's process of democratization, especially in what it concerns three major problems identified by the European Commission: human rights (ethnic situation), corruption and rule of law.²⁶

The first theoretical paradigm is Locke's function: civil society as a form of citizens' protection from state arbitrariness.²⁷ After democratic changes the existence of a separate social sphere, independent of the state is important. The institutions of civil society protect citizens against excesses by the state by acting as a buffer against possible predatory behaviour and by monitoring public performance on human rights abuses and corruption. Also, civil society helps to guarantee political accountability, the "distinctive hallmark of democracy".²⁸ It does so because civic institutions perform functions of communication, representation, and negotiation through which citizen preferences are heard and acted upon.

The activities of non-governmental organizations in Macedonia in the field of human rights protection are a good example of this civil society's function. The Ohrid Institute, as Biljana Janeva highlights, has been making efforts to monitor government's officials and their policies. One of its projects, The Monitoring of Leadership Project involves citizen monitoring of the Macedonian government in 10 fields (including financial affairs, foreign policy, education, health, agriculture, transport and construction) and has introduced the principle of holding a government responsible for its actions, opened it to the public input, and made the government accountable to citizens by measuring what it delivered against what was promised. Also a good sign of this involvement is the number of new applications (a total of 501) that were made to the European Court of Human Rights since October 2008.²⁹ Also, the number of written complaints received from the public rose to 594, from 496 in 2008.³⁰ In June 2010, there was a call for the withdrawal from parliamentary procedure of the draft law amending the Law on Electronic Communications.³¹ It was considered that the amendments created legal opportunities for arbitrary and unlimited use of eavesdropping and other forms of interception of electronic

communications that violate the basic postulates of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia (Article 17 and 25) that guarantee the inviolability of all forms of communication and protection of privacy and dignity.³² Macedonian NGOs were also concerned with the protection of human rights of children on the Internet-including the privacy of children-and the protection of privacy by the police and law enforcement agencies.³³

After the Parliamentary elections of June 2008, the Government and the Parliament used an unjustified fast-track procedure, to adopt changes and amendments to over 164 laws in July and 17 laws in the following month without any public debate. These changes included amendments of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on Communication Interception that widened the powers of surveillance for the law enforcement agencies. NGOs such as Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia (FOSIM), Association for Criminal Justice and Criminology of Macedonia and Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia condemned the legalization of preventive surveillance and removal of need to justify special investigative measures with evidence of reasonable doubt before the judiciary. These NGOs warned that these changes could turn Macedonia from a state based on a rule of law into a "police state unconcerned with respect of basic human rights and freedoms".³⁴

Regarding the problem of minorities, CSO continues to call on the authorities to make further efforts in implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). The fair representation of minorities, as provide for in the OFA, should be considered as a pillar for the reinforcement of democracy and the rule of law in the country.³⁵ Furthermore, the Office of the Ombudsman continues to make a valuable contribution regarding the legal and institutional framework for the protection of minorities.³⁶ State bodies continue to carry out the large majority of the Ombudsman's recommendations. And, as provided for in the Law on Protection and Enhancement of the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, a specialised agency for protecting the rights of minorities was set up as an independent state administrative body.³⁷ Although the agency is still not operational, this was the result of civil society's efforts and programs in the last years.³⁸ Lately, civil society has been pressing the government to take the necessary steps to extend the mandate of the European Agency for Fundamental Rights to the country.

In general, and accordingly to the European Commission, the involvement of CSO in Macedonia policy-making and in legislative drafting has "moderately progressed".³⁹ A good sign was the government introduction of mechanisms for consulting civil society organisations, and the announcement that draft legislation "should be accessible on the relevant ministry's webpage for public consultation and that civil society can participate in working groups for drafting laws".⁴⁰ However, the government only partially respected the existing consultation mechanisms and, overall, failed to engage in a meaningful dialogue with civil society. Most of the draft legislation and regulatory impact assessment forms were not available to the general public for review.

In Macedonia, one of the major problems in the process of consolidation of democracy and, consequently, in its path towards the European Union, is the lack of rule of law. The constitutional regulations, laws and a large number of ratified international acts show that there

is a solid and fair legal regulation. The problem is the inconsistent implementation and compliance with the law. According to the EC's last report, Macedonia has been taking steps towards strengthening the rule of law, but the structural weaknesses in the implementation of the laws and the inefficient courts, the politicized and weak public administration, corruption and organised crime are still a reality in everyday life. At this purpose, CSO have stressed the importance of strengthening the administrative capacity of the country in order to ensure the effective implementation of legislation.⁴¹

The second paradigm is Montesquieu's function: the balance between state and civil society.⁴² Although Montesquieu rejected a sharp distinction between the state and society, his division-of-power model takes into account the balance between central political power and the social network of "corps intermediaries". These corps are components of civil society, at the same time within and beyond the sphere of state power. Montesquieu's political ideas are still relevant, which is most clearly shown by the fact that in modern societies, including Macedonia, the prospects for the rule and authority of law largely depend on the social support of numerous civil associations.

The legitimacy of a political leader's claim to exercise state power thus derives from civil society. Put another way, responsive and effective government can only be built on a foundation of civic community. In this essential observation lies what Putnam calls "the seeds for a theory of democratic governance".⁴³ Walzer concurs "the quality of our political and economic activity and our national culture is intimately connected to the strength and vitality of associations".⁴⁴ On the same line, Cohen and Arato see ordinary people as the agents of modern civil society, creating it through "forms of self-constitution and self-mobilization".⁴⁵ Civil society is, by definition, participatory. It comes into being when people construct "a sphere other than and even opposed to the state...includ(ing), almost always unsystematically, some combination of networks of legal protection, voluntary association, and forms of independent expression".⁴⁶

CSO can ensure the efficient implementation of certain policies by participating and monitoring, thereby increasing public accountability.⁴⁷ It is often argued—particularly concerning development work—that civil society has a comparative advantage over state agencies by being more efficient, having more contacts, more knowledge of the needs, and more field-presence than state agencies.⁴⁸ Thus, a partnership in which civil society makes a critical contribution by making policy suggestions and cooperates with state agencies for an efficient implementation could increase regime performance. Improved regime performance, in its turn, is likely to increase the legitimacy of the regime.⁴⁹

Although very active, CSO in Macedonia have average success concerning the influence of their activities, especially in the areas of public policy, holding the state and private corporations responsible. Accordingly to CIVICUS report, civil society's key achievements are related to social groups like women and disabled people, or youth, pensioners and human rights. On the contrary, civil society has less or even no achievements in: impact on national budget process, anticorruption and private sector accountability.⁵⁰ Although extensive training for CSO has been provided in the last few years, there is still lack of knowledge and skills in

some areas like: democratic and responsible governance, financial management, and quality standards.⁵¹ An example of this problem is the low impact of the actions taken by civil society to eradicate poverty. Most of them are based on social-humanitarian grounds and they treat the signs of poverty; whereas few activities are based on development principles and directed to identify the root causes of poverty.

There are positive cases of an established dialogue and cooperation between the government and the CSO in Macedonia, in the last years. It is most often established during the drafting of laws or national strategies on certain issues or in cases of emergency (humanitarian) activities, such as the National Strategy Against Domestic Violence (2008/2010), the National Action Plan for Roma Women (2008), and the 2005-2015 Decade of Roma Inclusion.

In the last year, a government decision improved selection procedures and evaluation criteria for public financing of civil society organizations, and an office for contact between NGOs and Parliament was also created, though, as it is stated in Freedom House report “whether this will improve and increase relations between the government and the civic sector has yet to be seen”.⁵²

The third paradigm is Tocqueville’s function: civil society as school of democracy.⁵³ Freely organized civic associations are the largest schools of democracy, where a democratic way of thinking and civil behaviour are adopted and instituted through day-to-day practice and face-to-face communication.

Civil society as an educator can provide civic education and raise public awareness and understanding of the democratic system and thereby improve the democratic competence among citizens that is necessary for participation in the political process. Civil society can also contribute to an increased competence among civil servants and politicians, which can result in an improved regime performance and eventually a higher legitimacy for the democratic regime. Finally, if civil society organizations are democratically structured and civil, democratic attitudes and behaviour can be developed through participation in these organizations. This means that, if civil society organizations are to function as ‘large free schools’ for democracy (in Tocqueville’s term), they must function democratically in their internal process of decision making and leadership selection. And they should encourage and institutionalize multiple avenues for active participation among their members. The more their own organizational practices are based on political equality, reciprocal communication, mutual respect, and the rule of law, the more civil society organizations will socialize members into these democratic norms and the more they will generate the social trust, tolerance, cooperativeness, and civic competence that undergird a vibrant and liberal democracy.⁵⁴

In Macedonia, civil society conceived as a “school of democracy” is still fragile. There are some initiatives like the promotion of conferences and policy debates on issues of priority concern, such as local community development, poverty reduction, or minority’s integration.⁵⁵ These debates are positive as they increase the public awareness of policy issues and the CSO role in shaping them, as well as provide opportunities for the CSO leaders, officials, business and media to interact.

But, accordingly to Freedom House report, civil society is better in the promotion of democracy than practicing it internally.⁵⁶ Organizations such as the Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia (FOSIM) and the Macedonia Center for International Cooperation (MCIC) dominate the sector, often re-granting portions of their EU project funding to other groups. This is a difficult situation, particularly to a larger number of local organizations that do not have good relations with these two major organizations.⁵⁷ Also there are some evidences that the criteria normally used to grant making activities are not transparent.⁵⁸ This is particularly important in the Macedonia case, thus CSO have insufficient (financial) resources to achieve their goals. The lack of diversification of financial sources and the strong dependence on international or foreign sources are two major concerns. In 2009, EU financial support was provided to civil society through different national and regional horizontal programs of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) under the Civil Society Facility. Yet, few Macedonian NGOs are capable of competing for EU-tendered funds for civil society organizations, as the application process is demanding and requires technical skills and resources (Freedom House, 2010: 348).

Macedonian civil society, in general, has yet to attain the critical mass needed to become an influential actor at either the national or local level. Local NGOs rely on funding on a per project basis, rather than having access to core funding in key sectors. The Law on Sponsorship and Donations, which provides tax incentives to local or foreign entities for civic sector support, has not helped alleviate the situation because of the complex administrative requirements and lack of public awareness of the law among civil society organizations. Likewise, claiming tax deductions for donations in Macedonia remains complicated and confusing. Local philanthropy and volunteerism are almost nonexistent, while the participation of religious groups in charitable activities is minimal.⁵⁹

The fourth theoretical paradigm is Habermas' function: civil society as the public sphere and critique of the state.⁶⁰ Critical theory views civil society as the vastest social arena of interest articulation and aggregation by means of which the system of pre-institutional pluralist interest mediation is established. In today's Macedonia, this function of civil society is still in process. Another dimension of civil society as seen by Habermas makes his conception even more demanding: thorough spontaneous groups, organizations and social movements civil society should summarize, condense and bring into political sphere social problems arising in the private sphere thereby ensuring and increasing the attention of society. While such a civil society may be sensitive to social problems, it generally proves to be weak in the political field. This function of civil society and the creation of a democratic public opinion and critical public sphere are some of the goals to be attained in the process of consolidation of democracy in Macedonia.

Civil society can contribute to democratic development by setting priorities for agendas. One aspect of agenda setting is related to what Diamond refers to as "deepening democracy", i.e. making "the formal structures of democracy more liberal, accountable, representative, and accessible—in essence, more democratic".⁶¹ By observing potential flaws or problems, civil society could act as an agenda setter and draw attention to democratic deficits. Civil society

can, for example, draw attention to a lack of, and demand more, transparency in the public administration, an issue that politicians may be unwilling to raise.

According to Transparency International's 2009 Global Corruption Barometer, Macedonian respondents stated that the government was efficient in the fight against corruption. In the last year, further progress can be reported on prosecuting high-level cases, on strengthening the institutional framework and on cooperation between law enforcement agencies. The electoral code, law on financing of political parties and the law on conflict of interest were amended to strengthen transparency and new provisions on illicit enrichment were introduced. Nonetheless, corruption remains prevalent and continues to be a serious problem in many areas. Most of the legislative and policy measures relating to fundamental rights are in place, but implementation is uneven and further efforts are required (EC, 2009: 63). Among the country's institutions, the judiciary is considered the most corrupt; parliamentarians were perceived as extremely corrupt, while the public administration, according to 41% of respondents, was rated as very corrupt.⁶²

In the last years, several programs were adopted by domestic and international NGOs to help the country in its efforts against corruption, such as "Anti-Corruption Strategies for Local Governments" by FOSIM, which aimed to design and implement a process of participatory anti-corruption strategy at a local level as a method of identifying, preventing and fighting corruption, or the Program of Civic Platform of Macedonia to the next years, or even the projects adopted by the USAID/Macedonia. There is no evidence of corruption within civil society and the level of corruption in the CSO is perceived as much lower when compared to the other sectors. This relates to the fact that public trust in the civil society sector and religious communities is higher compared to the other actors in the society, especially compared to the public trust in the authorities and political parties.⁶³

The fifth paradigm is Putnam's function: the pluralistic role of civil society in the process of production of social capital.⁶⁴ Many authors and theories – from classical pluralists to Lipset, to contemporary theories of associative democracy – have emphasized the importance of the pluralist function of civil society.⁶⁵ In a post-communist society like the Macedonian, this function comes to be multidimensional. The function of civil society is to express the real plural interests of society, which is the basis for democratic pluralism in political life. It also throws a bridge over social cleavages, which play an important role in stabilizing and pacifying democracy in politically unstable regions, such as the Western Balkans.


Contemporary pluralist theories, including theories of civil society, have been increasingly focused on social capital, especially since the 1980s, when the concept of social capital was introduced by Pierre Bourdieu, and in 1993, when Robert Putnam's book *Making Democracy Work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*, was published. We understand social capital as the capacity of people to engage themselves in civic activities and in establishing relations based on mutual confidence, cooperation, and inclusive social participation. This cannot be created within a short period of time. So, Putnam's function of civil society – to produce and

increase social capital – is an essential precondition for democratic consolidation in post-communist societies.

Robert Putnam emphasizes that "civic community" is built upon norms and networks: norms of reciprocity through which social actors learn to trust one another and networks of interpersonal communication and exchange.⁶⁶ Together, such norms and networks comprise a stock of "social capital" which social actors can draw upon when they undertake collective action.⁶⁷ Michael Walzer argues that civil society breeds "communal men and women...the picture here is of people freely associating and communicating...forming and reforming groups of all sorts...for the sake of sociability itself".⁶⁸ In his view "the good life can only be lived in civil society" where citizens are guided by such "norms of civility" as social trust, political tolerance, and community activism.⁶⁹ The most important values for the construction of civil society are trust, reciprocity, tolerance, and inclusion. Trust is a prerequisite for individuals to associate voluntarily; reciprocity is a resource for reducing the transaction costs of collective action; political tolerance enables the emergence of diverse and plural forms of association. These values are promoted by citizens who actively seek to participate in public affairs. The presence of civic norms can be measured by sample surveys and public opinion polls and observed in voting, "joining," and varieties of collective behaviour. These norms of civic community are taught not only in the family but also by civic organizations such as schools, churches, and community groups.

Social capital in Macedonia is potentially available; however, the amount of the actual social capital and the use of this capital for democratic purposes depend to a great measure on the development of civil society, on the one hand, and on the advanced political field and the state, on the other. The participation of citizens in the public sphere has increased significantly since the country's independence (figure 1).

Figure 1
Citizen participation in non-partisan activities before and after 1991



Source: CIVICUS, 2005: 31.

But, while there is an increase in non-partisan political action in Macedonia, only a minority of citizens participates in civil society activities. Only one in four citizens is a member of at least one civil society organization, with activities, mainly, in social areas, such as poverty, employment, corruption, peace movements, and human rights.⁷⁰ This situation reflects the lack of visible impact and poor presentation of the results of CSO programs in addressing the community needs and the main challenges of the society such as unemployment or corruption.

One of the key characteristics of the civil society sector in Macedonia is the “lack of accountability”.⁷¹ Unlike authorities who must fulfil certain expectations, otherwise they risk not being re-elected and the business sector which is largely held accountable by stockholders, civil society organizations do not always have ways of measuring their success and therefore do not have a clear motivation to give results. This clearly influences their reputation and is one reason why the citizens and authorities “doubt” the civil society sector. Due to the fact that most of civil society’s funding relations are with foreign donors, there is a perception of primary accountability towards the donors and secondary, accountability to the constituency or general public. Nevertheless, there are important efforts within Macedonia CSO to change this situation.⁷²

CSO are expected to be main promoters of social values and stakeholders which should seek responsibility from other actors in the society, but in Macedonia, just as in any other country of the Western Balkans, transparency is a socio-cultural problem, resulting from Macedonia’s socialist past.

In order to be politically active, citizens require means to communicate with one another and to debate the type of government they desire for themselves. Civic discourse can take place in various *fora*, the most important of which are the public communications media. State or private monopolies of media ownership and public opinion are not conducive to civil society; civil society is always stronger where there is a diversity of media outlets and political views. In Macedonia, the situation is not very positive, since some television stations were considered politically influenced, due to the fact that the owners of these outlets are also presidents of

political parties.⁷³ However, the media continues to report on the activities of Macedonian NGOs, informing the public about projects completed by civil society organizations as well as press conferences or other events organized by local NGOs.⁷⁴

CSO in Macedonia face a great challenge ahead, which is realising long-term and deep intra-sector cooperation. The cooperation of CSO, especially concerning issues of long-term strategic interest, is relatively limited, and mostly based on the cooperation in the light of treating certain issues or lobbying for a particular law or regulation, such as the campaign for Breast Cancer legislation.

Based on the Directory of the Civic Organisations, 358 (41.7%) out of 858 CSO, claim that they cooperate with other organisations in the sector. But, the percentage of cooperation with other participants is much lower: 8% with the government, 9.8% with the units of local self-government, 4.9% with the institutes and 2.7% with the business sector.⁷⁵

Although there are also some examples of cross-sector alliances/coalitions of CSO, such as the Civic Platform of Macedonia, which aims at representing the long-term interests of the sector, *ad hoc* coalitions and networks focused on urgent needs and achieving short-term goals, are very characteristic.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, there some positive initiatives in this regard in the last years, such as the adoption of NGOs programs aiming to strength the internal capacities of CSO and their interrelations.⁷⁷ This is an attempt to promote the development of the civil society in Macedonia, which relies on citizen participation in organised forms, in its capacity to influence the public policy, and raise awareness on certain issues.

One major concern is the composition of CSO in Macedonia. Almost all social groups are presented as members of civil society but, the poor, rural communities and ethnic communities, especially ethnic Albanians, have a smaller representation. Thirty organizations out of 61 have less than 20% representatives of the ethnic communities in their assemblies and 32 of 61 have less than 20% representatives in their managing boards.⁷⁸ This means that the participation of ethnic communities, in almost half of the bigger civil society organizations in Macedonia is insignificant. This is a negative situation in a country already divided on an ethnic base. Civil society must give the example creating programs to further address these divisions, bringing CSO from Macedonia, from different sectors and ethnic background in joint actions for common benefit. One good example in this regard is the Civil Society Program of FOSIM, for the period 2009-2011, that has, as one of its main priorities to encourage equal participation and access of ethnic minorities and marginalized groups in public life.⁷⁹

CONCLUSION

The institutions of civil society have a crucial role to play in the consolidation of democracy. At the deepest levels of political culture, civic institutions include the political norms and values that underpin the rules of democratic competition. Democracy depends upon attachments among citizens to a matrix of civil liberties which they are willing to defend against encroachment by the executors of state power. At a more concrete level, civil society is the arena of voluntary associational life. A healthy democracy is founded on a plurality of organized social groups through which citizens learn the arts of associating together, practice the procedures of democratic governance, and express group interests to policy makers. It is through civic organizations that people participate in politics and development. Civil society also provides networks of communication among citizens, and between citizens and the state. The prime function of these communication include educating citizens about public policy issues, improving the transparency of public decisions, and helping to hold public officials accountable.

As this study shows, civil society can play an important role in the process of democratic consolidation. Built around strong values, Macedonian civil society is rooted in some social groups (women, disability, youth,) and playing important roles in the field of human rights, defending the rights of underprivileged minorities, or “making democracy work” in an even more direct way by, for example, informing and educating citizens or analysing government policy.

There are, however, a number of factors that seem to affect civil society’s democracy potential in Macedonia, such as the socio-economic situation, the history, and the political context, which are unfavourable. In this set, the most limiting factors are undoubtedly, the (lack of) rule of law, corruption, and the inefficiency of the state.

Civil society’s democracy functions are complex and constitute a mix of supporting and countervailing power functions. Civil society can contribute to democratic development by being a countervailing power and promulgating a democratic orientation of reforms. However, it is important to note that only as long as civil society organizations have a commitment to democracy will they advocate a democratic orientation of the reforms. Yet civil society may still act as a countervailing power, regardless of its internal democracy or whether the organizations are interested in democracy.

The levels of internal democracy and civility in civil society organizations affect civil society’s democracy-building potential. It is particularly the Tocquevillian notion that civil society organizations may serve as schools of democracy that is constrained by the internal levels of democracy. Thus, if we want to understand how civil society can strengthen democracy by a process of learning by doing, it is crucial to consider the degree of democracy within civil society organizations.

As the Macedonian case illustrates, many organizations are formally democratic but, in practice, these formal structures co-exist with authoritarian traditions, such as the lack of accountability or favouritism. Just like in many societies in the Western Balkans, there is a gap between formal democratic structures and informal practices. In other words, civil society is better at promoting democracy than in practicing democracy. In particular, there is limited application of organisations’ statutes and acts, and some conflict of interests. Many

organizations that were founded by charismatic leaders are failing to advice leadership from management and/or limit their powers.

Despite these problems that constrain Macedonian civil society, its positive effects lie in, what Putnam calls “social capital”. This means that civil society produces and creates social ties and values like trust and tolerance and the willingness to cooperate between individuals from different ethnic and socio - economic backgrounds. This is particularly important in a society where the high values are peace, non-violence and tolerance, as a response to the long wars in the Balkans and to the 2001 conflict in the country itself.

NOTES

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- ¹ In the United Nations and European Union documents, Macedonia is referred to as “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” due to a dispute over the country’s name, which is identical to a Greek province. For brevity, this paper will refer to the country just as Macedonia.
- ² G. Pridham and A. Agh, *Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001).
- ³ Larry Diamond “Introduction: in search of consolidation” in Diamond *et al.* (eds) *Consolidating the third wave of democracies: themes and perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
- ⁴ J. Linz and A. STEPAN *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
- ⁵ Linz and Stepan, *Problems*, 6.
- ⁶ T. Carothers *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The learning curve* (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999: 87).
- ⁷ Linz and Stepan, *Problems*, 7.
- ⁸ M. Warren *Democracy and association* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001: 57).
- ⁹ M. Foley and B. Edwards “The Paradox of Civil Society”, *Journal of Democracy* (1996) vol. 7, (3), 38-52.
- ¹⁰ A. Karatnycky “Making Democratization Work: Overcoming the Challenges of Political Transitions” *Harvard International Review* (2002) vol. 24, no. 2: 54.
- ¹¹ L. Diamond *Developing Democracy, Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999: 233).
- ¹² Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 260.
- ¹³ P. Schmitter “Civil Society East and West”, in Diamond *et al.* (eds.) *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, Themes and Perspectives* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997: 240).
- ¹⁴ Schmitter, *Civil Society East and West*, 240.
- ¹⁵ K. Raik “Promoting democracy Through Civil Society” *CEPS Working Paper* n.º 237 (2006) 5.
- ¹⁶ CIVICUS Civil Society Index *An Assessment of Macedonian Civil Society: 15 Years of Transition*. Skopje: Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (2005) 22.
- ¹⁷ This is the case of pensioners (Union of Association of Pensioners in Macedonia), women (Union of Women’s Organizations in Macedonia, Macedonia Women Lobby), environment (Environmental Movement of Macedonia) and disable (Community of Organizations of Disable of Macedonia, Inter-Party Parliamentarian Lobby Group).
- ¹⁸ In the last census there were 64% of Macedonians, 25% of Albanians, 3% of Turks, and 1.9% of Roma. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC). *The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – 2009 Progress Report*. SEC(2009) 1335 (2009), mk._report_2009_en.pdf (accessed 10 June, 2010).
- ¹⁹ CIVICUS, *An Assessment of Macedonian Civil Society*, 25.
- ²⁰ USAID/Macedonia. *Newsletter* (July 2010), <http://Macedonia.usaid.gov>. (accessed at 22 July, 2010).
- ²¹ EURACTIV. *EU-Macedonia Relations* (2010), <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-macedonia-relations-links dossier-329923> (accessed 10 October, 2010).
- ²² EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC). *The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – 2009 Progress Report*. SEC(2009) 1335 (2009), mk._report_2009_en.pdf (accessed 10 June, 2010).
- ²³ BLAIR, H. *et al.* *Assessment of the civil society sector in Macedonia*. USAID/Macedonia, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACY078.pdf (accessed 4 June, 2010).
- ²⁴ International Republican Institute, IRI Panel Looks at the Role of Civil Society in Democratic Governance (2010) <http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-panel-looks-role-civil-society-democratic-governance> (accessed at 10 November, 2010).
- ²⁵ (1) Checking, limiting and monitoring the power of the state; (2) supplementing the role of political parties in stimulating participation; (3) educating for democracy; (4) providing multiple channels for interest representation; (5) democratizing authoritarian enclaves at the local level; (6) generating a plurality of

interests that could cut across divides in society and thereby mitigate polarization; (7) recruiting and training new political leaders; (8) creating organizations with explicit democracy-building goals (e.g. election monitoring); (9) disseminating information and empowering citizens so they can defend their interests; (10) forming coalitions with political actors ; (11) developing techniques for conflict mediation and resolution; (12) strengthening the social foundations of democracy by community development work (13) enhancing “the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and hence legitimacy of the political system”. Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 240-250.

²⁶ EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC). *The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – 2009 Progress Report*. SEC(2009) 1335 (2009), mk._report_2009_en.pdf (accessed 10 June, 2010).

²⁷ W. Merkel, “Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe”, in *Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe*, ed. G. Pridham and A. Agh, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001, 97, 107, 108).

²⁸ Merkel, “Civil Society”, 7.

²⁹ European Commission, 2009, 15.

³⁰ European Commission, 2009, 16.

³¹ The call has been supported by more than 365 citizens so far, including prominent solicitors and other intellectuals, and was prepared based on expert analyses, taking into account the views of relevant stakeholders, especially NGOs dealing with human rights protection. EDRI-Gram, *Macedonia: Civil society calls for the respect of privacy* (2010), <http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number8.12/macedonia-civil-society-calls-privacy> (accessed 12 September, 2010).

³² EDRIM-Gram, 2010.

³³ EDRI-Gram, *Macedonia: Privacy Developments in 2008* (2009), <http://www.edri.org/edri-gram/number7.2/macedonia-privacy-2008> (accessed 12 September, 2010).

³⁴ EDRI-Gram, 2009.

³⁵ "Ohrid Agreement: Vital for European Path" - Speech by EU Commissioner Rehn (2007), http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_6754_en.htm (accessed 12 September, 2010).

³⁶ European Commission, 2009, 16.

³⁷ European Commission, 2009, 20.

³⁸ There are several NGOs programs in the field of human rights. See the annual reports of FOSIM, www.soros.org.mk, and Civic Platform of Macedonia, <http://gpm.net.mk/eng/program.html> (accessed 10 September, 2010).

³⁹ European Commission, 2009, 17.

⁴⁰ European Commission, 2009, 17.

⁴¹ Civil Society Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) “Conclusions. Skopje” (2010), <http://www.balkancsd.net/component/content/article/203--2nd-meeting-of-the-macedonia-eu-civil-society-joint-consultative-committee.html> (accessed 12 September, 2010).

⁴² Merkel, *Civil Society*, 2001, 97, 108.

⁴³ R. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993: 87).

⁴⁴ M. Walzer "The Idea of Civil Society" *Dissent*, (Spring, 1991), 298.

⁴⁵ J. Cohen and A. Arato *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge: M.A.: M.I.T. Press, 1992, ix, 17-18).

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ A. Hadenius and F. Ugglå “Making Civil Society Work: Promoting Democratic Development. What Can States and Donors Do?”, *World Development*, (1996) vol. 24, (10), 1628; J. Scholte, “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance”, *Global Governance* (2002), vol. 8, (3), 294.

⁴⁸ P. Burnell *Foreign Aid in a Changing World*. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997: 177-178; A. Hudock *NGOs and Civil Society. Democracy by Proxy?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999: 8).

⁴⁹ S. Lipset “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, *American Political Science Review*, (1959), vol. LII, (1), 69-105.

⁵⁰ CIVICUS, *An Assessment of Macedonian Civil Society*, 117.

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- ⁵¹ Interview to a responsible of Civil Platform for Macedonia, July 2010.
- ⁵² Freedom House. *Nations in Transit – Macedonia*. (2010) <http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2010/NIT-2010-Macedonia-proof-II.pdf> (accessed 10 September, 2010).
- ⁵³ Merkel, *Civil Society*, 2001, 98, 108.
- ⁵⁴ Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 228.
- ⁵⁵ See FOSIM activities <http://www.soros.org.mk/default.asp?lang=eng&menuid=98> (accessed 5 October, 2010). There is also a FOSIM program "Community Forums" which aims to support community development by providing active civic participation in decision-making and responsible and accountable local administration. The program consists of organizing forum sessions where municipal administration and citizens assess municipal priority needs. Through structured discussions they transform local priorities in specific project ideas and provide recommendations for solving community problems. During the last session forum participants jointly select the best and most relevant projects to be funded by program fund.
- ⁵⁶ Freedom House, 348.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ⁵⁸ The political involvement of the executive director of FOSIM, Vladimir, Milchin – either as a member of the executive board of SDSM in the past or as leader of the FOSIM-sponsored, Citizens for European Macedonia association, which is highly critical of the government – raises some questions about the objective criteria used in FOSIM'S grant making activities. Freedom House, 2010: 348.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Merkel, *Civil Society*, 99, 110.
- ⁶¹ Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 74.
- ⁶² Freedom House, 352.
- ⁶³ Interview to a responsible of Civil Platform for Macedonia, July 2010.
- ⁶⁴ Merkel, *Civil Society*, 109, 110.
- ⁶⁵ V. Pavlovic, *Globalization, Democracy and Civil Society: the democratic and authoritarian face of globalization* (Belgrad: Cigoja Press, 2004: 165).
- ⁶⁶ Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 172-3.
- ⁶⁷ J. Coleman "Social Capital and the Creation of Human Capital." *American Journal of Sociology*, 94 (supplement), (1998), 95-120. Uphoff "Grassroots Organizations and NGOs in Rural Development: Opportunities with Diminishing States and Expanding Markets." *World Development*, (1993) 21, (4), 607-622.
- ⁶⁸ M. Walzer, *The Idea of Civil Society*, 298.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid.
- ⁷⁰ CIVICUS, *An Assessment of Macedonian Civil Society*, 34.
- ⁷¹ Interview to a responsible of Civil Platform for Macedonia, July 2010.
- ⁷² A good example is the program of Civil Platform for Macedonia for the next years, which includes an initiative named "Together for transparency". This has become a traditional action of one group of CSO aiming to promote transparency among CSO and set example for other actors in the society. Each year, these CSO publish their financial and audited reports in daily newspapers and send their message for transparency and accountability to the public through press-conference. <http://gpm.net.mk/eng/component2.html> (accessed 5 October, 2010).
- ⁷³ Freedom House, 350.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid., 349.
- ⁷⁵ CIVICUS, *An Assessment of Macedonian Civil Society*, 50.
- ⁷⁶ The formation of Committee for Peace and Civic Initiatives was reaction to war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, The National Humanitarian Coordination were reaction to Kosovo and Macedonia crises, coalition "It's enough" was reaction to growing dissatisfaction with the government in the crisis period 2001-2002.

⁷⁷ See Program of Civic Platform of Macedonia, <http://gpm.net.mk/eng/program.html> (accessed 5 October, 2010).

⁷⁸ CIVICUS, *An Assessment of Macedonian Civil Society*, 42.

⁷⁹ See <http://www.soros.org.mk/default.asp?lang=eng&menuid=98> (accessed 5 October, 2010).